The eurozone's critical design flaws by Meyer, Henning
  
Henning Meyer 
The eurozone’s critical design flaws 
 
The Guardian Comment is Free 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Meyer, Henning (2010) The eurozone's critical design flaws. The Guardian (17 Feb 
2010) Opinion Piece.  
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/38566/ 
 
The Guardian 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: October 2011 
 
© 2007 Guardian Newspapers Ltd. 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
 
 
 
Printing sponsored by:
 
The eurozone's critical design flaws
A European Monetary Fund and governance mechanisms with 
bite would address the problems underlying the current crisis
 
Henning Meyer 
guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 17 February 2010 09.30 GMT 
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The problems Greece and some other eurozone countries are experiencing have 
highlighted a design flaw in the euro: it is ill-prepared to deal with asymmetric shocks 
because its balancing mechanisms, as Paul Krugman says, are inadequate. But in the 
case of Greece, there is also no doubt that serious fiscal irresponsibility combined with 
creative accounting ideas from Wall Street have severely aggravated the predicament.
But what can you do to prevent a Greek meltdown? In the worst case scenario the crisis 
spreads across the eurozone, seriously destabilising the financial system and triggering 
even greater social tension in Greece and elsewhere – not to mention the political 
implications for the euro and European integration in general. Britain too, as Will 
Hutton argued, will be hit hard if the Greek problem is allowed to escalate. So there is a 
clear case to take action.
Any sort of direct help from another European country, for instance Germany, for 
troubled Greece is difficult because of tight legal and constitutional restrictions. It would 
also outrage public opinion in both countries. In Germany, people would not 
understand why they had to endure wage reductions as well as social security cuts and 
now have to pay for a country that had not adjusted to competitive pressures. The 
Greeks would be outraged on sovereignty grounds, given that their fiscal policy would 
basically be run from Berlin if they received direct help.
Realistic measures that address the underlying problems can therefore only be taken at 
the European level. We need two mechanisms that we currently do not have: first, an 
emergency system that prevents a crisis like this from spreading across the eurozone; 
and second, better mechanisms to maintain and police fiscal responsibility. Let me 
explain the latter point first.
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The Maastricht criteria had been revealed as inadequate even before the financial crisis 
struck. Even though there were some minor changes, the rules were too inflexible to 
account for special situations that required more flexibility (such as dealing with the 
costs of unification in Germany) and were therefore more a fiscal straitjacket than a 
helpful mechanism to maintain financial stability. Furthermore, as we have just seen, 
the criteria can be circumvented by creative derivative deals. And when a crisis of global 
magnitude hits, it actually means very little because deficits will have to rise beyond the 
Maastricht limits.
These inadequacies point to the lack of an institutional mechanism to deal with such 
shortcomings. The stability criteria should remain the norm, but we badly need an 
economic governance system for the eurozone that has much greater oversight over 
fiscal discipline and that coordinates fiscal planning to prevent eurozone members from 
drifting too far apart. The Maastricht criteria policed by the European Commission are 
obviously not enough. The Lisbon treaty has formalised the Eurogroup for the first time. 
We need to use this as a basis to build new eurozone governance mechanisms with bite.
We also need a safety net to help EU member states in trouble. The idea of a European 
Monetary Fund (EMF), currently being floated, is a very interesting one. A newly 
established EMF should not only cover the eurozone but the whole of the EU and should 
be funded by contributions from all EU member states and some sort of European tax 
on the financial sector. This would also allow it to function as insurance for financial 
institutions funded by the industry itself. This is an idea the IMF is also working on. 
Countries outside the eurozone, like Britain, would then also have an additional security 
mechanism.
To be clear, having an EMF would not stop Greece and other countries from 
implementing cuts to realign themselves with the rest of the eurozone. But it would 
provide a tool to supply short-term liquidity attached to specific conditions, provide 
security for the financial system and, as a Centre for European Policy Studies report 
argued, even a structure way to deal with a default when it cannot be avoided.
In a nutshell, what the eurozone is currently experiencing is a theoretical design flaw 
becoming painful reality. It is not too late to address these issues but it is time that 
European governments make a decisive move.
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